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Abstract 
The concept of Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) was developed in response to 
the growing concerns over water use worldwide. In Kyrgyzstan environmental changes, glacial 
melt, a growing population and increasing industrial needs for water call for the development of 
sustainable ways of water use. Water governance in Kyrgyzstan has undergone radical 
institutional redesign since the country gained its independence in 1991. Centrally driven water 
organizations were replaced by a locally governed institution of Water Users Associations 
(WUA) across much of the country. The operation of WUAs was to be funded through 
irrigation service fees levied from water users. The progress of implementing such reforms in 
the water sector has however been limited.  
In order to understand the challenges faced during the reforms this study is based on a case 
study in the village of Arka situated in the southern part of Kyrgyzstan. It focuses on the 
qualitative study of local level water management. With an aim of bringing historical and 
cultural factors into the discussion of institutional development, the study draws on the concept 
of institutional bricolage. 
The study results demonstrate that the existing institutional arrangement incorporates elements 
of previous institutions along with the new concepts introduced through reforms. Thus 
interactions in water management today are equally influenced by the new WUA policies, such 
as payment of water fees, as well as the long-standing institutions of kinship and respecting of 
elders and authorities. Because the prevailing understanding of WUA as a government structure 
contradicts the new notion of ‘participation’, people seem to tend towards familiar ways of 
organization. Moreover new institutions have a risk of reinforcing existing power patterns and 
inequity in communities. Therefore the study concludes that any institutional interventions 
should be preceded by research of the existing institutional setup in water management. 
Building on existing successful experiences of collective action in communities is suggested as 
an effective way of institutional development in water governance. 
 
Keywords: Integrated Water Resource Management, Post-Institutional Theory, Institutional 
Bricolage, Water Governance, Kyrgyzstan  
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Introduction 
The concept of Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) was developed in response to 
growing concerns over water use worldwide. In Kyrgyzstan environmental changes, glacial melt, a 
growing population and increasing industrial needs for water call for the development of sustainable 
ways of water use. The biggest consumer of fresh water in the country – 94% -- is irrigated agriculture. 
Its share in the economy is close to 30%, employing 40% of the total population. Agriculture plays 
even greater role in the rural areas, presenting one of the major sources of livelihoods alongside animal 
husbandry and migration. In order to ensure a better balance between social, economic and 
environmental needs in fresh water use, the Kyrgyz Government adopted extensive reforms towards 
implementing IWRM principles in its water management policy.   
The reforms in the water sector of Kyrgyzstan followed the general transition of the country towards 
democratic governance and a market-oriented economy. Water governance in Kyrgyzstan has 
undergone radical institutional redesign since the country gained its independence in 1991 after the 
Soviet Union collapsed: from centrally driven to decentralized management and user participation, 
from state financing to cost-recovery, from free access to water to introduction of irrigation service 
fees. With the assistance of major donor organizations the Kyrgyz Government introduced the model of 
Water Users Associations (WUA) throughout the country to manage irrigation water use at the local 
level. WUAs are intended as membership based local organizations governed by the water users. 
Through the collection of water fees from users they can finance the operation of the user organization 
and maintain irrigation infrastructure within their constituency. In addition, the mechanism for 
participation of water users in decision-making built into the WUA structure, presumes that resources 
will be distributed equally.  
The progress of implementing the reforms in the water sector has however been limited. While 
regulatory principles of decentralization and introduction of water fees have seen good progress, 
advances in sectorial and ecological integration are estimated as very moderate (Herrfahrdt 2006). 
Many WUAs are facing difficulties both in reaching democratic management, and in achieving 
financial sustainability of their operations. This study aims at exploring local arrangements of water 
management in order to understand the problems of WUA operation. 
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The reforms in water governance have been inspired by the mainstream theories of New Institutional 
Economics and Common Pool Resource Management, which will be discussed below. While these 
theories have elaborated the importance of establishing formal institutions with the capacity of 
regulating collective action in natural resource management through incentives and sanctions, they 
often fail to account for the unique local institutional context. The major donor organizations, which 
have assisted the country in launching legislative reforms, have to a large extent been informed by the 
central assumption of these theories, i.e. that institutions can be designed to be effective. This in turn 
resulted in an ambition of finding and introducing the ‘right’ institutions at the local level.  
In order to analyze the challenges faced during the implementation of the reforms I decided to analyze 
the process using a perspective inspired by post-institutional theory. Post-institutional theory contests 
the idea of ‘designing’ institutions. Instead the concept of institutional bricolage is suggested as a 
framework for describing and understanding a management system. The process of bricolage is defined 
as the “patching together of institutional arrangements” (Chase-Smith et al. (2001) cited in Cleaver and 
Franks, 2005, p.4) from the various parts of the concerned society. Institutional arrangements might 
extend “from the cultural resources available to people in response to changing conditions, based on the 
logic of dynamic adaptation” (ibid). Thus it brings historical, social and cultural factors into the 
discussion of institutional development in any water governance system. 
The main objective of this study is to use post-institutional theory for analyzing the institutional 
challenges involved in implementing IWRM principles in local water management in Kyrgyzstan. The 
case study is based on fieldwork undertaken in March 2011, in the village of Arka situated in the 
southern part of Kyrgyzstan. Through the study I aim to understand how a newly introduced WUA is 
influenced by the already existing institutional environment. By first analyzing institutional 
arrangements in irrigation from the pre-Soviet and Soviet periods, I then explore how these 
arrangements were adapted and incorporated into today’s water management institutions. Drawing on 
the concept of institutional bricolage I argue that the current institutional setup is formed of the 
elements of both old and new institutions. Further I discuss the existing institutions in water 
management in Arka to see in which ways they enable or constrain implementation of reforms under 
the IWRM framework. Post-institutionalists emphasize the importance of the social embeddedness of 
institutions. They stress that to be practiced these institutions should be integrated into the existing 
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institutional setup and value system of the community. A question to ask therefore will be, are these 
newly introduced institutions of water management in Arka embedded in the pre-existing institutional 
environment? Finally, I intend to investigate  whether the institutionalization of new arrangements 
perpetuates or reproduces social inequities in the community in accessing irrigation water resources.   
This thesis includes eight chapters organized as follows. In Chapter 1 I begin with outlining the 
background information about the country, and a discussion concerned with the land and water reform 
implemented by the Kyrgyz Government. A review of the mainstream theories informing the reforms 
in the water sector is undertaken in Chapter 2. I then continue by discussing post-institutional theory in 
Chapter 3, where I suggest it to be the central theoretical perspective for this study. The objective of the 
research and research questions that guided my work is presented in Chapter 4. My next step in Chapter 
5 is to discuss the methodology and methods used during the fieldwork to seek answers to the research 
questions. The main findings of the case study on institutions regulating local water management in 
Arka village are discussed in Chapter 6. Further I analyze the institutional arrangement of water 
resource management in Arka in Chapter 7 using post-institutional theory. Lastly I summarize the 
conclusions of this study in Chapter 8.  
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Source: Adapted from BBC 2011 
Table 1. Brief facts about Kyrgyz Republic 
1 Background 
In this chapter I introduce the economic, political, and social background of Kyrgyzstan, since these 
conditions shape institutions in the water sector. A brief presentation of facts about the country’s 
agricultural and irrigation sectors will be followed by an overview of the historical changes and 
reforms that took place in the related sectors of agriculture and irrigation. Furthermore I will outline the 
development of the central institution regulating relationships in irrigation water use at the local level, 
namely Water Users Associations (WUA).  
Country profile  
Kyrgyzstan is a mountainous country located in Central 
Asia with a total population of approximately 5.5 million 
people. Arable land makes up only 7% of its total land area 
of about 199,000 sq.km. Even so, agriculture is the second 
most important sector of the economy accounting for about 
30% of GDP and 40% of the total employment (World Bank 
2007). Irrigated agriculture plays an even bigger role in the 
livelihoods of rural population of Kyrgyzstan (60% of 
employment) and provides more than 90% of the total 
agricultural produce of the country (CAIConsulting 2010). 
Due to climatic conditions, agricultural activities in the 
lowlands of the country are only possible with irrigation. Of 
1.35 million hectares of cultivated land, 80% or 1.07 million hectares are under irrigation (FAO 
AQUASTAT 2004). During the Soviet times a complex water management system was established to 
serve the centrally planned agricultural production on the expanding territories. Irrigation was 
organized primarily through the diversion of rivers via an extended network of near surface, gravity-
driven distribution canals.  
The multiple rivers which originate in the snowfields and glaciers of the mountains, supply water to the 
extensive irrigation system. This irrigation system includes distribution networks at primary, secondary 
Kyrgyz Republic  
Capital Bishkek 
Population 5.5 million 
Total Area 199,000 sq km 
Government Parliamentary 
republic 
GNI per capita US $870 
Major languages Kyrgyz, Russian 
Major religions Islam, Christianity 
Main exports Fruit, vegetables, 
gold, tobacco 
HDI 0.598 (medium) 
Gini (2003) 30.3 (medium) 
Currency Som (KGS) 
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and tertiary levels. At the primary level the irrigation system is composed of the major canals and water 
reservoirs. These are often part of the strategic industrial objects such as large hydro-electric stations 
operated by state companies. Secondary or inter-farm level networks used to deliver water to former 
kolkhozes and sovkhozes, during the Soviet period. After the abolishment of the collective farms, the 
irrigation infrastructure at the inter-farm level was transferred to district water departments. Their 
maintenance has since been funded primarily from the state budget with a minor contribution from 
water fees paid by water users. Finally, on-farm or tertiary canals serving the fields of a former kolkhoz 
or sovkhoz have been handed over to WUAs. The changes in water management have mostly affected 
this level of irrigation practice, because the governance of irrigation systems at the local level was 
transferred to the water users. Infrastructure maintenance became the responsibility of the WUAs, to be 
covered through collection of the newly introduced water fees. In this study I focus my attention on the 
local level of irrigation water management, in order to understand how a local population adapted to 
institutional changes over time.   
11 
Fig. 1. Map of Caucasus and Central Asia showing the location of Kyrgyzstan and neighbouring countries. Source: http://
fs.huntingdon.edu/jlewis/syl/ircomp/MapsCaucasus.htm#Regional (2011-06)
Due to the lack of finance following Kyrgyzstan’s independence, the water distribution system of the 
country suffered major deterioration. Particularly, this holds true for the inter-farm and tertiary level 
canals, majority of which are earthen and not lined with concrete (CAIConsulting 2010; Koshmatov 
2004 cited in Herrfahrdt et al. 2005). According to Ul Hassan et al. (2004), water losses at the primary 
and inter-farm networks constitute between 26-45%, and losses at the tertiary level reach up to 50% of 
irrigation water. These losses lead to regular water shortages in rural areas during the irrigation season, 
and are considered as one of the primary causes of conflicts over water resources (Allouche 2007, ICG 
2002).  
Today, the agricultural sector is estimated to consume up to 94% of the total water use in the country, 
leaving 3% each for industrial use and domestic needs (FAO AQUASTAT 2004). Snowfields and 
glaciers represent the main source of the extensive water resources of the country. Annual runoff totals 
12 
about 47 km
3
/year (Johnson III et al 2002). However under current international agreements
Kyrgyzstan is entitled to the withdrawal of only up to 25% of the total annual runoff while the 
remaining resources flow to the downstream countries (see Annex 1 Distribution of water in CA). 
These agreements are legacies of the Soviet agricultural policies according to which downstream 
countries, namely Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, were the main producers of cotton for the USSR. After 
the collapse of the Soviet Union and declaration of independence in 1991, Kyrgyzstan faced the need to 
reform both the agricultural and water sectors of the economy to meet the requirements of the new 
reality.   
Land and water reforms in Kyrgyzstan 
To place the current water management in its historical context I will briefly discuss how irrigation 
water was managed in pre-Soviet and Soviet times. O’Hara’s (2000) study on pre-Soviet irrigation 
practices in Central Asia provides evidence of successful irrigation systems that had the capacity of 
supporting good agricultural production and maintaining soil quality. This system was based on the 
cultivation of small land plots and the constant regulation of irrigation in accordance with the recorded 
water inflows. According to O’Hara (2000) the irrigation systems were labour intensive and so 
demanded the work of several key persons, who were rewarded on the basis of their performance. She 
explains that mirab bashi, always a man, held the key function in any irrigation management system. 
He was responsible for making decisions of water allocation and distribution. Moreover he was elected 
by the farmers and rewarded according to how satisfied farmers were with his work. Similarly mirabs, 
in charge of the secondary canals, were elected and paid by the local farmers. O’Hara (2010) also 
describes the practice of annual maintenance of irrigation networks. These works were carried out by 
water users on a voluntary basis and organized by the ketman, which was a water users association 
comprising 3-4 villages (ibid). The same practice – ketman – continues to exist in the rural 
communities of Kyrgyzstan today. In the village of Arka, community members come together every 
spring, before the start of the irrigation season, to plan, then clean and repair the canals.  
The institutional arrangement of water management in pre-Soviet times is portrayed to have been 
effective in balancing social and ecological needs. It was built upon locally elected institutions and 
small scale agriculture, the features currently promoted by IWRM and sustainability studies. Some 
aspects of the institutional arrangements of pre-Soviet times can still be seen in the current water 
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management system. WUA Council members are elected locally, and the staff members remunerated 
with the water fees paid by water users. The institution of murabs was adapted within the Soviet 
irrigation system, and later incorporated into the WUA structure. This suggests that some elements of 
pre-Soviet irrigation institutions continue to influence the current system.   
Soviet irrigation reform brought radical changes to the “traditional” forms of water management in 
Kyrgyzstan and the entire Central Asia. Locally elected decision-making institutions and small scale 
farming were replaced by formal government organizations responsible for the irrigation sector and the 
collectivization of land under collective and state farms. While pre-Soviet irrigated agriculture was 
limited in size, land reclamation and virgin land campaigns resulted in a rapid increase of irrigated 
areas in Central Asia. O’Hara (2000, p.370) estimates that “the Soviets opened an additional 5 million 
ha of land for irrigation in Central Asia, bringing the total area of irrigated land to 7.5 million ha 
altogether” (O’Hara 2000, p.370). Large scale infrastructural developments accompanied this process, 
seen through huge reservoirs, extensive irrigation networks, and pumping installations for regulating 
the water flows and transporting water over long distances (O’Hara 2000).  However, the maintenance 
of the network lagged behind the construction, and reportedly by 1985 a major part of infrastructure 
needed repair works (Thurman 1999, p.236 cited in Bichsel 2008). 
The hierarchical management structures that were coupled with the central production planning 
contributed to inefficient decision making and the undermining of local knowledge and expertise in 
irrigation management. Water management in the Kyrgyz SSR was seen as an engineering task, where 
irrigation officials were mainly concerned with the supply of the required volumes to the sites. The 
supply management approach to water use in this period failed to build the responsibility for rational 
use of the resource. Instead it promoted a perception that water resources were unlimited and available 
free of charge (Herrfahrdt et al. 2005). Such a management approach resulted in the over-exploitation 
of water resources of Central Asia, causing the renowned Aral Sea disaster.  
The command driven water management system set up by the USSR proved to be inefficient and 
unsustainable. Therefore, following the collapse of the Soviet Union international financial institutions 
(IFIs) offered the newly independent state of Kyrgyzstan assistance to reform its economy towards 
democratic development and market economy. In the absence of the possession of its own internal 
funds and other development alternatives, Kyrgyzstan undertook radical reforms through implementing 
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development strategies agreed upon with the providers of aid. According to the neoliberal concept of 
“shock therapy” rapid liberalization of all sectors of the economy and privatization were seen to  lead 
to economic stabilization and to allow for the “invisible hand” of the market to solve the problems of 
efficiency and financial sustainability.  
The land reform process in Kyrgyzstan began in 1991 first with the development of peasant farms, 
followed by legalization of land use rights in 1994 through the Presidential Decree “On measures to 
enhance the land and agrarian reform in the Kyrgyz Republic” (LD 1). State and collective farms were 
liquidated and their land areas distributed as shares to the rural residents. The Land Code enacted in 
1999 furthered the reform process by introducing private ownership titles to land shares, thus giving 
owners of land the right to purchase, sell and rent in or out agricultural land plots. Seventy five percent 
of all agricultural land was distributed as land shares, with an average share (at the national level) 
constituting 0.37 ha per person
1
 (Chemonics 2008). However family members usually pooled their land 
shares and cultivated them together, thus the size of a cultivated plot reached 1 ha and more. The 
remaining 25% of land was transferred to the state-owned Agricultural Land Redistribution Fund 
(LRF) for future needs. LRF is managed by the local self-government – aiyl okrugs – and is available 
for leasing by farmers.  
Land reform resulted in an enormous increase in the number of individual farms. This created a great 
challenge for the irrigation sector to organize water supply in accordance with the differing water 
requirements of these farms. Before land distribution, a tertiary level irrigation network used to supply 
water to large-size monoculture kolkhoz fields. After distribution, it had to cater for the water needs of 
up to 2,000 individual farms in lieu of a single state farm. The challenge for water management was not 
only in the increased number of water users, but also that each water user demanded water in different 
volumes and at different times depending on the cultivated crops. Abolishment of the institution (i.e. 
kolkhoz) responsible for on-farm networks, and lack of funds for the operation and maintenance 
(O&M) of infrastructure, left the management of water at the farm-level neglected. This further 
exacerbated the already deteriorating state of irrigation infrastructure.  
                                                          
1
 This figure varies in different regions depending on the density of population. Land share size was calculated by dividing 
the total land available for distribution to the number of people entitled to receive a share in the given region. Thus land 
share size in the southern provinces is smaller compared to the northern part of the country. 
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Water management reform also came after the country’s development strategy towards establishing a 
market economy and a political system of democratic governance. The “Law on Water of the Kyrgyz 
Republic” (LD 2) adopted in 1994, regulating all aspects of water use, was the first step in the 
institutional reform of this sector. Introduction of irrigation service fees (ISFs) in 1995 aimed at 
providing funds for O&M costs. However, the low amount of ISF
2
 requested, and the novelty of the 
ISF concept to farmers who before had not had to pay for irrigation water, resulted in very low 
collection rates. In addition wide-spread economic hardships experienced in rural areas at the launch of 
reforms, due to the afore-mentioned collapse of the Soviet Union and thus reduction in subsidies to 
local economies, explained the general inability of farmers to pay the irrigation fees. The initial 
arrangement was that the District Water Management Departments (DWMDs) were responsible for 
signing water supply contracts with individual water users, and to collect the fees. This proved 
ineffective both in management logistics and in administration costs.  
Establishment of Water User Associations 
In 1997 the Kyrgyz Government passed a Decree “On Adoption of the Resolution on Associations of 
Water Users in the rural areas” providing a legal basis for establishment and operation of WUAs (LD 
3). Later in 2002 the Kyrgyz Parliament enacted the Law “On Associations of Water Users” (LD 4). 
The introduction of WUAs in Kyrgyzstan was originally initiated in 1996 within the ADB funded 
project ‘Building Capacity for WUA Formation and Management and Agricultural Sector Programme’. 
The first eight pilot WUAs were established with an aim to distribute water to its members, resolve 
arising disputes, collect water fees, and maintain on-farm irrigation infrastructure. The concept of 
WUAs was strongly backed both by the Government of Kyrgyzstan and international donors. The 
WUA model corresponded to both ideals promoted in the country – establishing democratic institutions 
that facilitate transition to a market economy. Governance of irrigation systems was transferred to 
water users and operational costs were to be covered through water fees. A number of donor 
organizations financed projects aimed at the development of WUAs. Interventions included assistance 
in establishment of WUAs, building capacities of WUAs, and rehabilitating tertiary irrigation 
infrastructure (see Annex 2: List of the major projects supporting WUAs in Kyrgyzstan). In order to 
                                                          
2
 The amount of ISF in 1995 was 15 Som (approximately 0.4 Euro) per 1000 m
3
, increased to 30 Som per 1000 m
3
 in 1999 
(Herrfahrdt et al. 2005) 
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access the funding for rehabilitation, WUAs had to fulfil certain requirements on organizational and 
financial development. For instance, to receive a loan for rehabilitation of the canals provided by the 
World Bank or ADB, WUAs were assessed against seven milestones. These included establishment 
and legal registration of the WUA, training of staff, introduction of ISF and its collection, preparation 
of rehabilitation plan and its approval by the members. If WUAs could not achieve the required 
milestones, their rehabilitation projects would be postponed or the WUA would be excluded from the 
potential list of recipients of the funding (Johnson III et al. 2002). Under this project about 455 WUAs 
were established across the country. Additionally 40 WUA Support Units at all administrative levels of 
state water departments were set up and trained to support institutional development of the WUAs 
(World Bank 2008). The organizational chart below (see Figure2) describes the model structure 
prescribed for WUAs and the prescribed functions of each of its bodies.  
As voluntary non-commercial associations, WUAs are supposedly set up at the initiative of their 
members. In practice however, WUAs in Kyrgyzstan have been formed either under the instruction of 
the Government or under the control/motivation of international projects. The top-down establishment 
of WUAs is often blamed for their inefficiency (Abdullaev et al. 2009, Wegerich 2000). A total of 475 
WUAs were registered in Kyrgyzstan as of 2010 covering 736,000 ha or 73.7% of the total irrigated 
land of the country (CAIConsulting 2010). However not all of the registered WUAs are 
operational.High indebtedness and inactivity are mentioned as the main reasons for non-functioning of 
WUAs (Sehring 2005). Many still face problems with collection of fees, consequently influencing the 
quality of services for the O&M of infrastructure, and ability to attract professional employees. WUAs 
have also faced challenges on the part of participatory management.  
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Source: Adapted from Herrfarhdt et al 2005 and Sehring 2005 
 
Fig. 2 Model organizational structure of WUAs  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
During field research in Arka, one of my informants stated that the mobilization and information efforts 
to popularize local water governance in the community were insufficient (SE 2011).  Institutions that 
developed during the Soviet period remain unchallenged and continue to regulate people’s actions. 
Thus the persistent top-down management style in water organizations hinders decentralization of the 
Governing Body 
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 Controls the performance 
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 Elected by GA and 
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 Elected by GA 
 Approx. 5 members 
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 Draft budgets and work plans 
on O&M 
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water suppliers 
 Record demand for and delivery 
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Auditing 
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Accountant Hydro-engineer 
Murab 1 Murab 2 Murab X 
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decision-making in the WUAs. Predominance of the Soviet period elite in management structures 
contributes to the problem, by resisting the changes towards participatory and transparent water 
management. However the failing performance of the WUAs is not only caused by the Soviet period 
institutional arrangements that continue to exist. Some elements of today’s local water management can 
be seen from studies on pre-Soviet arrangements of irrigation water use. The institution of murabs 
presents such an example. It allows the assumption that the current institutional setup of local water 
management incorporates elements from different historical arrangements of water use. The strong 
influence of kinship relations on interactions in water management discovered in the case study of Arka 
confirms the assumption of importance of historical factors in institution building. Therefore I suggest 
that post-institutional theory could be a useful tool in understanding institutions in local water 
management. 
In summary, water governance in Kyrgyzstan has undergone repeated radical institutional redesigns. 
First, there was a transformation from locally elected institutions in irrigation to centrally driven 
hierarchical Soviet management institutions. Small scale agricultural practices were replaced by large-
scale state farms with intensive use of machinery and monocultural production. Skilful regulation of 
water use in accordance with natural inflows in the pre-Soviet period laid the basis for a balanced 
resource use and the maintenance of good soil quality. The Soviet water management system relied on 
qualified engineers and agronomists who had the task of maximizing agricultural output often at the 
expense of maintaining an environmental balance. After the end of the Soviet Union, the reforms in the 
water sector aimed at decentralization of water management at the local level. Mechanisms for 
participatory management of water resources were introduced through the model of WUAs. Land 
privatization and land distribution led to the return of agricultural production to small scale diversified 
farming. Thus we can see how water management moved from local level to central and then back to 
the local level. However the current water management practices at the local level cannot be called 
effective, neither from an economic nor from an environmental perspective. In this view, the question 
arises of what can be learned from the water management arrangements of the pre-Soviet period.  
Inspired by neo-liberal studies, institutional reforms in the water sector were strongly backed and 
funded by powerful international donor organizations, if not presented conditionality for accessing 
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funds. In the next chapter I present an overview of the main theoretical approaches to natural resources 
management that laid the basis for the water sector reform in Kyrgyzstan.  
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2 Mainstream views on institutional reform in NRM 
The changes of the institutional environment of water management in Kyrgyzstan can be attributed to 
two mainstream theories. In this chapter I will present a brief overview of the New Institutional 
Economics (NIE) and Common Pool Resource Management (CRRM) theories. In continuation another 
strand that is currently gaining a wide support of international organizations, including those in 
Kyrgyzstan, namely, the Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) framework will be 
discussed in detail. IWRM presents a management framework informed by mainstream theories of NIE 
and CPRM as well as sustainability studies. Its principles laid basis for the Water Code of Kyrgyzstan 
adopted in 2005. 
New Institutional Economics emphasize the role of formal institutions in regulation of natural 
resource use. Its theories are based on the assumption that people are rational choice agents, meaning 
that they choose to act in a way maximizing economic benefit for them. Therefore market forces are 
offered as the best regulating institutions for effective use of natural resources. Institutions according to 
the followers of NIE shall provide incentives to promote the desired behavior and sanctions to punish 
free riders and cheaters (Del Callejo & Cossio 2009, Shah et al. 2002). This belief in market forces in 
natural resources management is shared by the major international donor organizations. NIE principles 
were manifested in the famous Structural Adjustment Programmes implemented in developing 
countries. However natural resource management systems based on private property relations lead to 
marginalization of the poor and raising inequalities in those communities. Therefore recent policies 
stress that water resources should not be seen only as an “economic” good, but also as a “social” good 
to provide for an equal access to water resources for basic human needs.  
Irrigation Management Transfer programmes implemented worldwide, including in Kyrgyzstan, are 
also inspired by NIE theories. The aim of these programmes is to decentralize irrigation management. 
NIE theories underline the importance of formal institutions such as enabling legislative framework, 
service fees and participation in decision-making. Nevertheless institutions introduced in accordance 
with these programmes do not perform as expected by NIE theories. The major cause of their failure is 
negligence of the local historical, cultural and social context and informal institutional context where 
these reforms are taking place. Human action in NRM cannot be explained purely as “rational 
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economic choice” because it is influenced by the variety of institutions, values and beliefs rooted in the 
community. 
Common Pool Resource Management theory evolved as an alternative view to the state managed and 
private property systems of natural resource management. CPRM equally stresses the importance of 
institutions in the management of common resources. Moreover the theorists distinguish between 
“weak” and “robust” institutions. They call for ‘crafting’ the right institutions in order to improve 
natural resource management practices. According to Ostrom (1990) individuals interested in a 
common pool resource can develop robust institutions based on the following “design principles”: 
Table 2. Institutional Design Principles  
 
• There should be clearly defined boundaries of jurisdiction over the resource.  
 
• A clearly defined user group or community should manage the resource.  
 
• Locally appropriate rules must be devised.  
 
• There should be clear identification of rights to resources and rules about them.  
 
• Those involved in resource use take part in decision making about the resources.  
 
• Decision making should take place in public, in arenas to which all resource users have access.  
 
• Accountable monitoring and effective authority structures are required.  
 
• Graduated sanctions should be devised for non-compliance with collective rules. Such sanctions 
must be applied consistently, rapidly and impersonally.  
 
• Conflict resolution mechanisms should be clear, accessible and rapid.  
 
• The ‘nesting’ of local institutions with other levels of decision-making and governance allows multi-
layered management of resources in large and complex systems.  
 
Source: Ostrom 1990, p.90 
 
 
CPRM studies have shown that institutional arrangements for sustainable natural resource management 
can be developed locally. There is no one-size-fit-all solution to the diverse NRM situations.  They 
highlight the role of informal institutions in these practices. However, recommendations presented by 
these studies mainly concern designing of effective formal institutions. The notion of effective or 
“robust” institutions is criticized for functionalist perspective on institutions. Local meanings of the 
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institutions therefore become neglected. For instance, an institution presumed by an outsider as 
ineffective in performing its function can have other cultural meanings for the collectivity. In contrast 
to the widely accepted understanding of the social and ecological systems as open, dynamic and 
uncertain, the approaches of both CPRM and NIE assume these systems to be closed with defined 
boundaries.  
I think that this emphasis on designing effective institutions is misleading for understanding the process 
of institutional formation. Firstly, the effectiveness of an institution cannot be assessed within the limits 
of natural resource use practices. Institutions in the communities have multiple purposes and can be 
practiced in different spheres of community life. Secondly, the institutions designed to be effective for 
natural resource management may contradict others practices in the community. In such case these 
institutions will probably not function regardless of all principles adhered to. This also implies that 
informal institutions including cultural norms, beliefs and worldviews often have a greater influence on 
people’s behavior in the community producing practices assumed as “irrational or ineffective” by the 
outsider.  
Integrated Water Resource Management framework was developed in view of the growing concerns 
over sustainability of water resource use. It recognizes an interdependence of social and natural 
processes as well as complexity and uncertainty inherent in them.  
Figure 3. IWRM Pyramid   
 Source: Herrfahrdt et al. 2005 
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Having incorporated the concepts of mainstream NRM theories and sustainability studies the IWRM  
provides a practical management framework to organize water governance in a way that balances social 
and economic needs and ensures sustainable development of ecosystems. It promotes participatory 
decision-making across all sectors to include the needs of all water users – domestic users, agriculture, 
industries and the environment.  
IWRM incorporates all four dimensions of good water governance together: social, environmental, 
economic and political dimensions. The main principles of the framework can be summarized as: i) 
integrated management of all water sources at the basin level, ii) local decision-making that integrates 
the needs of all sectors using water, iii) ensuring equitable access, iv) managing demand via cost 
recovery policies, and v) setting up enabling institutional framework (see Figure 3. IWRM Pyramid).   
Major international actors promote application of IWRM principles across the world. Elaboration of the 
Water Code of Kyrgyzstan was also guided by IWRM framework. The Swiss Agency for Development 
and Cooperation (SDC) is actively promoting introduction of IWRM in the irrigation sector across in 
the Ferghana Valley. In Kyrgyzstan these principles are being streamlined into operation of pilot 
WUAs. Practical implementation of IWRM in pilot WUAs includes organizing them along 
hydrographic boundaries. Project builds the capacity of pilot WUAs to promote transparency and 
accountability of their operation and improve user participation. An increase of the ISF amount is 
encouraged so that WUAs can better maintain their infrastructure, attract professional staff and 
organize better water supply (Johnson III et al. 2002, Sehring 2005, Sehring 2006, CAIConsulting 
2010).  
The progress towards the ideal is however still limited. Formal institutional environment, i.e. relevant 
legislation, is in place but its implementation is far from satisfactory (Herrfahrdt 2006). While 
regulatory principles of decentralization and introduction of water fees have seen good progress, 
advances on sectorial and ecological integration are estimated as very moderate (Herrfahrdt 2006). 
Limited success of IWRM implementation is attributed to its vague definition, lack of a practical 
guidance for implementation and ignorance of social, cultural and political context (Chikozho 2007, 
van der Zaag 2005, Saravanan et al. 2009). Being based on the mainstream theories of NRM 
institutions IWRM similarly underestimates the importance of the local context. Although IWRM 
presents a useful theoretical framework to understand the social and environmental processes, in 
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practice it often transforms into a checklist for projects. Main issues in implementation of IWRM are 
faced at the local level, which is the focus of this study. Formal institutions promoted in the 
communities of Kyrgyzstan under IWRM projects, such as WUAs, water fees, participation and 
collective responsibility, need to go through the process of institutionalization. Success or failure of 
institutionalization depends on both the existing institutional setup that may clash with new institutions 
and the human agency. The latter holds a potential for institutional changes. But this potential is limited 
because the existing institutional arrangements in the communities, mostly of informal character, 
greatly influence human actions in institutional building.  
Summarizing the discussion above, the challenges in introducing IWRM principles in Kyrgyzstan are 
seemingly rooted in the theories informing this approach, namely NIE and CPRM theories. Both 
theories focus on the formal institutions required for effective natural resource use practices. The 
standardized institutional setup that is offered under these theories for replication as good water 
governance across all communities of the country fails to consider the specific local historical and 
cultural context. This failure results in widespread difficulties faced by WUAs in their operation. 
Therefore central assumption that institutions of good water governance can be designed is highly 
contested. Post-institutional approach discussed in the following chapter provides an alternative 
perspective to institutional building process. According to this approach local resource management 
arrangements are combined of the elements of existing formal and informal institutions and the new 
concepts that are often imposed on the local communities (Cleaver 2002). 
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3 Theoretical approach of this study 
In this chapter I will lay down the main ideas of post-institutional theory on the process of institution 
building in NRM practices. Discussion of its central concepts will be followed by the formulation of 
research objective and research questions of this study. The post-institutional theory will be used in the 
following Chapter 7 to analyze the findings of the case study.  
The central concept of post-institutionalism is institutional bricolage. It is used to describe the process 
of institutional formation. The term “bricolage” implies that elements of already existing institutions 
are used in the process of producing new ones (Sehring 2009, Cleaver 2002). Institutional bricolage is 
defined as a process of “patching together of institutional arrangements from the cultural resources 
available to people in response to changing conditions, based on the logic of dynamic adaptation” 
(Chase-Smith et al. (2001) cited in Cleaver and Franks, 2005, p.4). Thus historical and cultural factors 
come into play influencing institutionalization of new concepts. It can be concluded that the evolving 
institutional arrangements of natural resource management are never completely new, but rather a 
combination of elements of existing and new institutions. Drawing on this concept I intend to analyze 
the existing water-related institutions in Arka village in Kyrgyzstan to identify how previous 
institutional arrangements influence institutionalization of the new concepts introduced during the 
reforms.  
Institutionalization of new concepts requires them being embedded in the social fabric of the 
community. This process can be influenced by the logic of another institution. In this way bricoleurs 
may apply the community logic in water institutional arrangement (Sehring 2009, Cleaver 2002). To 
understand if water-related institutions are socially embedded, institutions regulating other aspects of 
livelihoods and their role in irrigation water use have been equally scrutinized during the fieldwork.  
In this study I use the definition of institutions proposed by post-institutional studies. According to 
post-institutionalism institutions are not necessarily visible bureaucratic structures, they are “what 
people do, and institutions by their nature are not necessarily robust, solid, and enduring, but must be 
continually reproduced or re-enacted to exist” (Lund 2001 cited in Cleaver & Franks 2005, p.4). The 
interaction between human agency and structure is central to this definition implying that institutions 
enable and constrain agents’ actions in natural resource management. At the same time institutions 
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exist through agents’ practice in social interactions, during which they can be changed or adapted to the 
circumstances. In this process individuals are guided by conscious decisions and unconscious practice 
equally, which contradicts the view of individual as a rational actor maximizing economic benefit 
(Cleaver 2002). Through the process of less conscious use and adaptation of existing rules and 
practices to new purposes, the new institutional arrangement so produced becomes a legitimate custom 
or tradition or “the right way of doing things” (Cleaver 2002). Being embedded in the cultural 
environment institutions also reflect the prevailing values, norms and beliefs of the community 
practicing them.   
Widespread classification of institutions into formal and informal or traditional and modern is highly 
contested by post-institutionalism. Instead the terms bureaucratic and socially embedded institutions 
are proposed. Bureaucratic institutions are defined as formalized structures, regulations and rights, 
which are often the focus of governments and development agencies. Whereas socially embedded 
institutions are those based on culture, social organization and daily practice, which are often missed 
out by NIE and CPRM studies as discussed above. It is also stressed that this differentiation is not 
clear-cut and institutions may be changed in both directions (Cleaver 2002, p.13). However while the 
change towards bureaucratization can be achieved through top-down intervention, the change towards 
social embeddedness of the institution is only possible through the process of bricolage, from bottom 
up.  
The process of institutional building or bricolage takes place during social interactions. Social 
interactions are also influenced by power relations, which can influence the process of shaping 
institutions. Interventions aimed at bringing more equity in access to natural resources will have to 
challenge the existing institutions favouring some of the members. Institutionalization of new concepts, 
particularly establishment of formal institutions, therefore risks resulting in reinforcement of inequities. 
Case study analysis intends to identify if the newly introduced institutions in water resource use are 
successful in achieving equal access to water resources in the community or not.  
Post-institutional approach in my view can provide a valid explanation to the challenges faced in the 
process of institutional reform in Kyrgyzstan along the lines of IWRM principles. This theory was 
applied by Sehring (2009) in her study of water reforms in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Her findings 
confirm the importance of historical context in the process of implementing reforms in the water sector. 
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According to her path dependency in institutional formation leads to creation of a hybrid regime, in 
which former patrimonial relations and power of local elite prevails over deliberative democratic 
processes promoted by new institutions of water use (Sehring 2009).  
Thus I intend to base my analysis of the case study on post-institutional theory. The central concept of 
institutional bricolage will allow me to incorporate into analysis the historical development of 
institutional setup in water use practice in Arka. By focusing on the institutions rooted in the social 
fabric of the community I intend to see the influence of the institutions organizing community life on 
water use practice. It will also demonstrate how the newly introduced institutions relate to the 
prevailing institutional context, values and beliefs in the community. This theoretical framework will 
help to identify the challenges in implementation of IWRM principles in Kyrgyzstan, which is the 
objective of my study. 
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4 Research objective 
The objective of this study is to analyze institutional challenges to implementing IWRM principles in 
irrigation water management in Arka village of Kyrgyzstan from the perspective of post-institutional 
theory. Using the post-institutional theory I intend to analyze the existing water-related institutions in 
Arka village in order to identify how previous institutional arrangements influence institutionalization 
of the new concepts introduced during the reforms. 
The research subject is the process of institutional formation in irrigation water management in Arka 
village in Kyrgyzstan.  
To fulfill the objective of the study I intend to apply the concept of institutional bricolage to understand 
the process of the partly conscious and partly unconscious formation of new arrangements using 
elements of existing institutions. By analyzing pre-Soviet and Soviet time institutional arrangement of 
irrigation I will explore how these were adapted and incorporated into today’s water management 
institutions. I will also discuss how they enable or constrain implementation of reforms under IWRM 
framework. Further I intend to analyze embeddedness of new concepts promoted by IWRM in the 
institutions regulating diverse aspects of community livelihoods. Finally, I will seek how 
institutionalization of new arrangements perpetuate or reproduce social inequities in the access to 
irrigation water resources.   
The following research questions were formulated based on the above tasks and guided the process of 
data collection during literature review and field research: 
1. What are the institutions regulating social interactions in irrigation water management?  
2. How previous institutional arrangements in the community influence the current water 
management practice? 
3. What is the role of power relations in institutionalization of the new institutions? How they 
influence equality in access to resources? 
4. In which way does the current institutional arrangement support or constrain implementation of 
IWRM principles in irrigation water management in Arka village of Kyrgyzstan? 
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5 Methodology 
I chose qualitative research methodology for this study to enhance the understanding of institutional 
aspects of irrigation water management. I first started with an overview of the literature available on 
my research focus. And then conducted a fieldwork in the village of Arka located in the southern part 
of Kyrgyzstan.   
Review of policy documents, donor publications and academic literature provided information for the 
theoretical framework of the study. Legislative documents referred to in this study are numbered 
consecutively under the abbreviation LD (LD 1, LD2 …). The list of the legislative documents is 
provided in the references section. Review of the academic literature revealed a relatively low level of 
interest in empirical studies of the institutional arrangement of irrigation at the local level. Most of the 
available literature, in particular concerning implementation of IWRM in this region, is produced by 
International Water Management Institute – implementing partner of IWRM Ferghana project funded 
by SDC. Therefore it is mainly concerned with normative aspects of the theories. 
The case study with a focus on qualitative research methods supplied important information for the 
study. It was conducted between March 10 and March 26 with a repeated two-day visit in the beginning 
of April. I used the method of participant observation throughout the fieldwork. In this process I could 
see how people interact with each other when working on their fields, how they interact with the local 
irrigation officials and observe physical elements of irrigation system. It was particularly useful to 
verify the statements made assessing the interaction of people with WUA representatives. For example, 
I participated in the public works on cleaning the irrigation canal in the village. Observations on how 
the WUA head manages the process and gives instructions to people helped me see his management 
style in practice. The advantage of it was that my intervention in the social interactions was kept to a 
minimum. In order to get clarifications or opinion of the people on the situation I used interviews. 
Although I could get the perception of my informant on the situation, the answers risked to be distorted 
by his/her expectations and understandings of what I expected to hear from them. Key informant 
interviews aimed at gaining in-depth information about the issues, on which the informants held expert 
knowledge. For example to in order to get details of how the WUA operated I held key informant 
interviews with the head of the local WUA. When I needed clarifications on how current agricultural 
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production is organized I turned to a young successful farmer, whereas for information on how it was 
organized in Soviet times I chose to address a former sovkhoz agronomist. While with the government 
officials, representatives of donor organizations mainly semi-structured interviews were conducted, 
informal conversations proved to be effective with the community members. Throughout this study I 
refer to the interviewees using their initials and the year of the interview. An example of reference to an 
interview is “SE 2011”. This was done in order to avoid disclosing the identities of the interviewees. 
Because I was not able to present my research findings to the interviewees I could not ask for their 
consent to publish their names. 
In order to verify the data collected I used a combination of several methods or several sources on the 
same issue. Note taking was preferred over voice recording during interviews to avoid intimidation and 
time consuming transcription process. Methodological approach of the research did not require it 
either. 
Participation in the community events and unrelated talks in informal settings contributed to more open 
dialogues, especially with younger age females. This approach also improved acceptance of my 
assignment in the village as compared to the initial disappointment of interviewees that my stay in the 
village did not produce any direct practical benefits for them. As the majority of formal positions in 
irrigation were held by middle-aged men, the first contact was organized by a male acquaintance, who 
assisted me in the field study. After I introduced myself and the aim of my study, I could establish 
further contacts directly without the help of a middleman.  
The facts that I originated from the southern region and spoke the language of donors were probably 
the reasons why my role in the community was often perceived as their ‘voice’ to international 
decision-makers. I could recognize this assumption after noticing that some facts were exaggerated. 
Additionally, some interviewees openly asked me to deliver their message to those in Bishkek (capital 
city) so that they make necessary decisions. This situation did not seriously distort collection of the 
data and could be easily corrected through triangulation. This is why I decided to continue accepting 
this role. 
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The major challenge in conducting this research was related to the ability to identify and recognize 
those institutions deeply rooted in the society. I attempted to question my assumptions and 
interpretation of the findings with the use of reflexivity principles.  
Site selection 
Arka village in the southern part of Kyrgyzstan was selected for conducting a field research for this 
study. The criterion of representativeness was not the primary one in the decision of site selection as 
the purpose of case study was to gain an understanding of the institutional arrangements of irrigation 
water use. The choice area was restricted to the south of the country, particularly Ferghana Valley, as it 
was the site for piloting IWRM and other water related projects. Important condition was the size of the 
community to enable an adequate coverage of the subject within the limited time. And final choice was 
made in favour of an existing contact and previous knowledge of the community.  
Limitations of the study 
Field research only covered one community in the south of the country. Therefore the results of this 
study cannot be generalized for all parts of Kyrgyzstan. Considerable differences in informal 
institutional settings between southern and northern parts of the country could lead to less relevance of 
study findings for the north. However most of the historical and political factors influencing institution 
building were similar throughout the country. Finally, such studies on the development of institutional 
setting in natural resource management would gain from longer-term ethnographic studies than one 
possible under the timeframe of MSc programme.   
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6 Results 
In this chapter I will present findings of the case study about the institutions regulating irrigation water 
management. First I will provide a description of the current administrative arrangement of water 
resource management in Kyrgyzstan at different levels. A brief summary of the donor-driven 
institutional arrangements in the water sector will complete the picture of the external environment 
influencing local water management in Arka village. After the background information on Arka village 
I intend to present a detailed discussion of the main institutions in local water management discovered 
during the field study.   
Administrative arrangement of the water resource management in Kyrgyzstan 
The current institutional arrangement of the water sector of Kyrgyzstan has been largely inherited from 
the Soviet times administration. Headed by the newly established State Committee of Water Resources 
and Melioration
3
 its regional structures are organized along administrative-territorial units of the 
country (see Annex 3. Institutional arrangement of water sector in Kyrgyzstan). Although the names of 
the territorial departments have changed to Basin Water Management Department, water allocation is 
still implemented within the administrative boundaries. Water demands are communicated to the 
district level agency, which then sends a cumulative amount further up for approval by the State 
Committee. However implementation of the decisions on allocation of resources is the responsibility of 
lower level Basin water management organizations (BWMO). Water sector along with other sectors of 
Kyrgyz economy suffer from lack of implementation of a consistent national strategy. This can be seen 
from frequent reorganizations of government ministries and agencies and replacement of key positions
4
 
leading subsequently to a loss of institutional capacity/memory. This coupled with frequent political 
disturbances in the country add to the challenges of institutional development in the water sector. Thus, 
despite considerable progress in the legislative framework (Water Code), water management system of 
the country is criticized for its centralized decision-making, lack of coordination and cooperation 
                                                          
3
 Until 2009 national level management was carried out by the Department of Water Resources under the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Water Resources and Processing industry. 
4
 Change of the political leadership of the country is as a rule accompanied by reorganization of government structure and 
replacement of the top management of government agencies. This in turn entails changes of professional personnel 
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between different government agencies with often duplicating functions within the water sector, and 
low level of transparency and accountability (Herrfahrdt et al. 2005).  
National water policies of Kyrgyzstan are set by the Parliament of the country. These policies are 
executed by the national level management bodies together with its subordinate 7 province and 40 
district level water management organizations. The tasks of the State Committee of Water Resources 
and Melioration include regulation of all water uses including domestic and industrial needs. It 
oversees implementation of international water allocation agreements and supervises overall 
performance of BWMO. Rehabilitation of state-owned irrigation infrastructure is also one of the key 
functions of the Committee. Provincial level and district level basin water management departments are 
responsible for organization of water supply within their territories. They are in charge of O&M of 
irrigation infrastructure and organization of ISF collection. Leilek DWMD is accordingly responsible 
for the water supply in the territory of the district. It signs water supply contracts with the WUAs and 
organizes the delivery of water volumes as per these contracts. Maintenance of inter-farm irrigation 
network is the responsibility of the DWMD. Additionally, the Leilek DWMD oversees adherence of 
water allocation on transboundary rivers to the quotas agreed between neighbouring countries. 
WUA Support Units are set up to provide advisory, training services, and methodological support to 
the WUAs and are often the focal point for donor projects working with WUAs. According to the 
Leilek WUA Support Unit staff they conducted trainings on technical, financial and managerial issues 
of water governance for all WUA specialists in the district. These trainings are usually financed by 
donor projects and their content reflects the donor-supported ideas of good water governance. The 
trainings thus cover the issues of financial efficiency, participatory decision-making, transparency and 
accountability of operation, equitable distribution of water and its efficient use.   
Arka village  
The village of Arka is situated in the westernmost Leilek district of Kyrgyzstan at the border with the 
Republic of Tajikistan (see map below). It was founded in 1967 as a separate brigade of the Soviet 
sovkhoz Comintern simultaneously with the neighbouring Borborduk village with a purpose of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
within the agency with a few exceptions. Such practice is attributed to the corruption in the recruitment process and 
strong prevalence and commitment to patronage networks based on kinship. 
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Fig. 2 Map of the Ferghana Valley. Approximate location of Arka village is marked with a red cross.  
reclaiming the lands of Arka valley (approximately 14000 ha). Today its population reaches 2886 
people in 574 families (IA 2011). The first houses in the village and its social and productive 
infrastructure was built by the sovkhoz. Young families from the villages at the mountain foothills, 
namely Margun, Dargaz, Darhum, moved to this new site. The name “Arka” means “the backside” or 
the other side of the hill. The task of these brigades in Arka village was to provide fodder for the 
animal husbandry of sovkhoz in the upper villages, as well as to grow grain crops, grapes, tobacco and 
some cotton. According to the former hydro-engineer cotton production did not prove high yields due 
to the specific sandy soil requiring considerably more watering of the fields, this is why the cotton 
production plans were lifted from this sovkhoz (AS 2011). Due to its arid conditions and sharp 
continental climate the arable land can only be cultivated with irrigation.  Irrigation was organized by 
the sovkhoz management through hydro-engineers and irrigators (murabs).  
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The water to the fields was supplied from Kairakkum water reservoir in the territory of Tajikistan with 
the help of a powerful pump. In exchange for the land of the former Kyrgyz SSR that was used for 
building irrigation canal taking water further to the fields of Tajik SSR, Tajik SSR committed to 
provide water to the two settlements of Kyrgyz SSR – Arka and Borborduk -- free of charge.  
Although allegedly the agreement stipulates an annual volume of 25 million m
3
 per annum, according 
to the WUA staff only 11-12 million m
3
 reach their fields. Moreover the period during which pump 
station operates is restricted to the end of April until the end of September each year. This is related to 
the huge costs of running pump station. Also this schedule is suited to the vegetation period of cotton 
and rice, which are main crops in the fields of Tajikistan downstream of the canal. Repeated requests of 
the farmers to the local government authorities to negotiate prolongation of the irrigation period with 
Tajik authorities did not change the situation. According to the unpublished conflict potential report 
prepared by a local NGO, Tajik authorities suggested the Kyrgyz side to pay 60,000 US dollars per a 
prolonged month of operating the pump station (FTI 2003). Neither Kyrgyz Government nor local 
farmers are able to afford paying this amount. Total income from agricultural production in these 
villages was estimated to reach approximately 255,000 US dollars per season (SE 2011). This suggests 
that the costs of providing irrigation to the fields of Arka and Borborduk villages are not justified from 
the economic viewpoint. However the local population expects the Government of Kyrgyzstan to 
protect their interests in front of the Government of Tajikistan and take all required measures to ensure 
the flow of water to their villages. Their main argument and suggestion to the local authorities is to 
influence the decisions of the neighbouring country through decreasing water quotas from Kozu-
Baglan river. The river originates in the mountains of Kyrgyzstan and flows into Tajikistan. However 
the policy of both countries so far has been to leave the inter-governmental agreements on water 
allocation of transboundary rivers from Soviet times in force until new agreements are made. Because 
agriculture represents key source of livelihoods for the majority of the population in both countries, 
disagreements over their allocation have been assumed to be the biggest threat for inter-ethnic conflicts 
(FTI 2003). However all disputes so far could be settled at the local level. 
The farmers in Arka have adapted to the restricted period of irrigation by growing crops that require 
less watering within the period when water is available. Apart from the more traditional crops such as 
wheat for food, maize and barley for fodder, the most profitable agricultural activity during the last few 
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years has been growing beans. It requires irrigation only three times during the vegetation period, 
requires less labour and can be marketed well and catches a good price at the neighbouring food market 
in Tajikistan’s Kostakoz village (HA 2011). Another tendency dictated by the restricted access to water 
and marketing possibilities has been turning fields into orchards. Fruit trees similarly do not require 
frequent watering and dry fruit is easily marketed in Tajikistan. Admittedly, Arka villagers have closer 
economic ties with neighbouring Tajik settlements as compared to Kyrgyz settlements. They prefer 
Tajik markets for both buying and selling of their produce due to the shorter and more convenient 
transportation and better demand and supply. 
Agricultural income makes up a considerable part of household income. There are very few paid jobs 
available in the village apart from self-employment. These are mostly small businesses trading 
consumption goods, food products and services. Vast majority of the villagers directly depend on their 
land for livelihoods. As a result of privatization all citizens residing in the village at the time of the 
reform received their land shares formerly owned by the sovkhoz. While for some families agricultural 
activities are a primary source of income, for those with salaries from official positions in the village, 
such as teachers, nurses, post officials, or those with small businesses, agricultural income provides a 
bulk of money for life-cycle celebrations (toi) or other investments. A local teacher estimated her 
income from agriculture (apricot trees) to constitute 60% of her annual income, which she uses to pay 
the costs for university studies of her children (UA 2011). Especially in view of the growing food 
prices, irrigated agriculture in Arka therefore represents the key source of livelihoods for the local 
population.  
Migration flows present another external factor influencing the livelihoods and institutional changes in 
the local communities. According to the head of the village more than 250 people are currently 
working in the Russian Federation with some more in Kazakhstan and the capital city of Bishkek. 
Remittances from migrants support the local economy through increased consumption and savings, 
mainly in the form of livestock. In some cases income from remittances undermines the willingness of 
people to invest their labour in agriculture. “It is easier to ask to send 200 US dollars every month for 
food and other expenditure than to cultivate land. So they just lease their land plots out to the locals or 
Tajiks” (SE 2011). Migration also removes the required labour resources from the village, leaving 
behind families headed by women or elder parents. At the same time one returning migrant noted that it 
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is possible to earn the same income at home if one works as hard on the land. According to him 
migration is only a temporary solution and young people will return to their homes sooner or later (AH 
2011).   
From the discussion above it can be concluded that the local population recognizes that the amount of 
available water is limited. Farmers started adapting to these circumstances by changing their crop 
patterns. However they tend to view in rather a technical perspective of running the pump or 
negotiating with the Tajik authorities. Recognition of environmental change implications is largely 
absent. It is also clear that irrigated agriculture is central to livelihoods of Arka. Therefore policies 
influencing agricultural sector have a big influence on the livelihoods of the people. In the next section 
I will describe and discuss how the people of Arka have adapted different institutions to regulate the 
precious water resources in the community. 
Institutions of irrigation water management in Arka village 
Water Users Association is the main formal institution of water use management in the village. It was 
founded in 2004 soon after the adoption of the Law “On water users associations” and named “Aikol”. 
The total service area includes the fields attached to two villages of Arka and Borbodruk and equals 
1111 ha, of which 620 ha are land shares of Arka residents. Water users are organized into Water User 
Groups of 20-25 people, and the leader of each group signs a contract of water delivery with WUA. 
Currently the price for 100 liters of water is set at 12 Kyrgyz Som per hour. Out of this amount 33% is 
paid to the DWMD and the remaining is used for salaries, administrative expenditure and O&M of the 
canals. However the persisting problem with collection of the fees means that the budget line for 
O&M
5
 remains unfunded. Currently WUA “Aikol” employs 9 staff members including the director, 
accountant, hydro-engineer, and 6 murabs
6
. The director, accountant and the members of the audit 
commission are appointed annually by the WUA Council members. The current director and 
accountant have been in service since 2007.  
Because WUA was founded under the instructions of the Government by the staff of DWMD with no 
consultations with the water users, it is seen as part of local government organizations. “They are 
                                                          
5
 In 2011 budget line for infrastructure O&M in Aikol WUA is allocated around 10% of the total budget. 
6
 Murab from Arabic stands for water master. 
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middlemen, they have been set up to collect water fees from us for the RUVH (DWRMD) and earn by 
charging extra” (HA 2011). Due to the long-standing culture of respecting the ‘master’, which is still 
common in many rural areas of Central Asia, the authority of such formal institutions is rarely 
questioned. Taking its roots from feudal-type organization of the society in the pre-Soviet history, such 
attitude towards those in power continued under the central command driven system in the Soviet 
Kyrgyzstan. Furthermore it is practiced today despite being seriously damaged by the promotion of 
democratic values after independence. This example seems to demonstrate the process of bricolage. 
Along with adapting to the new formal institutional arrangements people continue practicing the old 
institutions, creating a combination of institutions.  
It is believed that the repeated incidences of the Government of Kyrgyz Republic overthrown in 2005 
and 2010 have contributed to the stronger belief in the peoples’ power. WUA management perceives 
them as rather exercising power in water distribution than providing services to the members. The 
manager states “I need to be strict and I do shout at them (water users) when it is necessary to ensure 
discipline and collect the water fees” (AG 2011). This understanding of the WUA’s role established in 
the interactions between water users and WUA management, which are informed by the existing 
norms, have led to the lack of progress in implementing the principles of participatory management of 
water resources. Participation takes form of a pure formality required every year. The annual report 
sheet, minutes of the annual meetings and decisions are typed in the computer before the meeting takes 
place leaving blank gaps for filling in the actual numbers in the financial report, amount of water fee 
and number of attendants. Thus because the prevailing understanding of the ‘government structure’ and 
‘participation’ contradict each other, people seem to tend to the familiar ways of organization. 
Water is delivered to the fields by murabs. Once influential decision-makers in pre-Soviet times, they 
were re-qualified to merely implement the decisions and ensure water delivery to the kolkhoz/sovkhoz 
fields in the Soviet Union. Today murabs in Arka are hired staff of WUAs to deliver water as per 
farmer’s/group leaders request. The job becomes quite challenging in the early season when water 
demands exceed the supply. During these days they have to deal with emotional farmers and water 
theft practices
7
, which former murab finds “too much for the remuneration they get” (IA 2011). It is 
notable that murab can solve the dispute over water in favour of the one who pays him an additional 
                                                          
7
 Water theft here implies farmers driving water to their field in breach of the agreed schedule. 
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reward. General lack of transparency in water distribution is a contributing factor. Both water theft and 
this type of corruption are well-known and accepted practices in the community. The former is 
tolerated due to a general conflict avoidance attitude and the latter as a common mechanism, which any 
farmer in need can resort to. This is why they became established as social institutions in water use in 
the community. Such mechanisms are used not only in water resource management but also other 
spheres of community life.  
The kinship system represents another influential institution regulating community life in general and 
water use practices in particular. In pre-Soviet period kinship provided an important social security 
system to its members. Although Soviet Government tried to provide such security, kinship ties were 
not suppressed and remained relatively enforced. They were employed when accepting relatives to the 
party membership, recruiting to kolkhoz jobs, distributing resources, etc. It regained its importance after 
independence and the collapse of the state-supported social security system. Today many political 
decisions at the local level are decided in accordance with belonging to certain kin/clan. Candidates to 
a leadership position, be that local governments, Parliament or presidency, actively employ kinship 
networks for gaining political support. In the absence of formal social security schemes maintaining 
kinship and friendship networks is of as big importance for ensuring future stability as investing in 
diverse livelihoods for the household. Also in Arka the decisions on electing WUA Council members, 
selecting WUA staff, and generally electing representatives in any kind of councils are guided by 
kinship relations. For example, the current head of WUA, who according to one local resident “does 
not even know how to measure the volume of water” (Anonymous 2011) originates from the same clan 
as 4 of the 5 members of the WUA Council, which could be the motivation for his appointment. This 
presents another example of institutional bricolage, when formal election procedures of WUA are 
combined with informally accepted ways of favouring the candidate with kinship ties.  
The power of kinship also manifested in the process of distribution of land shares. Thus relatives and 
friends of the local powerful group/elite received better quality land shares located in the proximity to 
residential areas and with a good access to irrigation water (Sehring 2009). Similarly, in Arka those 
interviewees complaining about unprofitability of cultivating their lands located in a long distance and 
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Fig. 4 Local aksakal telling about irrigation in Soviet times.  
Source: Own photograph (2011) 
without good access to water turned out to have no relations to the local elite
8
. Here ownership of a 
land plot in a good location and access to water receives a symbolic meaning of belonging to a 
powerful group and higher economic category of villagers. As marginalized people as a rule do not 
enjoy access to social capital provided by such networks it can be assumed that they are also excluded 
from distribution of valuable land plots located close to watergates. Introduction of WUA aimed at 
addressing fair distribution of water resources. However as appointment to the management positions at 
WUA is dependent on the kinship leaders and local elite, it ends up in favouring the same circle of 
influential people. In addition many donor projects tend to choose the head of the village – aiyl bashy – 
or other representatives of the community elite as their focal point for implementation of projects. 
Ensuring fair representation is often difficult due to the limited time of donor organizations and a 
pressure to produce results in an economically efficient ways. However it may have serious 
implications for the project results. In such cases the project focal point might use the information to 
influence institutional development efforts in his/her interests.  
 Despite of provisions for water dispute resolutions and sanctioning procedures stipulated in the WUA 
establishment documents, these are 
rarely enforced. All water disputes 
over distribution are usually dealt with 
at the site with the murab or with 
involvement of WUA leadership. In 
case of nonpayment of water fees 
WUA first turns to the court of the 
elders – aksakaldar sotu. The notion 
of aksakals (literal translation “white 
beard”) originates from pre-Soviet 
organization of community life and 
means the eldest leaders of the kin that maintain the traditions and history, make major decisions and 
resolve internal disputes. It is closely linked to the norm of respecting the elders. Later it was adapted 
                                                          
8
 A woman of Tatar nationality obviously does not have kinship relations and small business owner with little attention to 
maintaining kinship relations received a land share at the tail-end of the canal 8 km away from the village. Both currently 
do not cultivate their plots since several years. 
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Fig. 5 Local people during canal cleaning in Arka. Source: Own photograph (2011) 
by the Soviet Government to suit the power structure of that time. Institution of aksakals changed to 
include besides the older kin representatives also young and respected bureaucrats working for the 
party (Bichsel 2008). Inspired by a new wave of reviving national ideology following the independence 
of the country, the court of elders – aksakaldar sotu – was formalized through relevant legislation as a 
local institution to arbitrate and mediate locally disputed affairs. In this process their decisions are 
legitimized through recognition of their authority in the community and the widely practiced norm of 
respecting the elders. In the case of Arka, aksakaldar sotu is formed under the local self-government – 
aiyl okrug – in the capital village Borborduk to serve all four villages in its territory. WUA informs the 
members of aksakaldar sotu in writing about the nonpayment of water fees. The persons mentioned in 
the letter are then invited to the meeting where the case is considered. Using their authority and calling 
to abide by the cultural norms of behavior, aksakals set a period within which the debt shall be settled. 
However this mechanism has not been productive yet. According to the WUA leadership they are 
considering turning to the official law enforcement bodies to help them resolve the problem, and are 
announcing this decision to the debtors (IA 2011). Removed from their support base within the smaller 
communities tied with kinship aksakals seemingly lose their legitimacy and power. Thus artificially 
supported and formalized institution cannot carry out its functions properly. But the growing 
acceptance of water fees and a possibility of ‘real’ sanctions from the government’s side may result in 
better collection.  
Ashar as a form of voluntary 
public work is widespread in 
this part of the country. 
Cleaning irrigation canals in 
the early spring before the start 
of irrigation season is a 
tradition since pre-Soviet 
times. The picture to the right 
shows the canal cleaning 
ashar that took place during 
the field work in Arka village. 
Mobilization of people for this 
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work did not require much effort as this practice is rooted in history and community values. Ashar thus 
represents an institution based on the value of respecting the community.  
A striking feature of irrigation institutions is its almost complete dominance by male members of the 
community. Although explained by the patriarchal culture it contradicts one of the main requirements 
of good governance – equity. Many scholars document that women carry out the majority of work in 
agriculture, however they cannot take part in the decisions of planning water use in the community.   
In summary, the current institutional arrangement in Arka village combines institutions specifically 
regulating water use and those setting norms of general community life. Many of these institutions 
survived through a long history of changing government regimes and adapted to the new realities. 
Similarly concepts underlying operation of WUAs are going through the process of adaptation to the 
existing circumstances. However a contradiction is notable between the current culture based on the 
values of respect to the elders and community, and the deliberative democratic processes laying basis 
of WUAs. Market-oriented elements of WUA operation are slowly gaining public acceptance due to a 
general development of markets in this area, and not least due to incorporation of the economic 
interests of kinship network and local elites. This explains a relative progress on the part of economic 
sustainability of WUAs as compared to ensuring participatory management of WUA. In the next 
chapter I intend to analyze these findings from the perspective of post-institutional theory.  
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7 Discussion 
This chapter discusses my main findings of the case study in Arka village presented above using post-
institutional theory. I will start with the discussion of the process of institutional formation drawing on 
the concept of institutional bricolage. I will continue discussing importance of social embeddedness of 
new institutions introduced in Arka to ensure their successful operation. Finally I intend to raise the 
issue of power relations in the process of institutional formation. In addition current problems in the 
introduction of institutions aiming to provide equal access to water resources will be discussed to 
inform future work of researchers and practitioners.   
Institutional bricolage in irrigation practice of Arka 
In the chapter above we could see the examples of the process of bricolage in forming the existing 
water-related institutions in Arka village. From the case study it is clear that the previous institutional 
arrangements deeply rooted in the value system and social organization of the community tend to 
persist through changing government regimes. Thus kinship networks based on the values of kin 
relationship, respect to elders, community, and also providing the key social security for the households 
to address economic uncertainties, seem to have strong influence on institutional formation throughout 
pre-Soviet and Soviet times. Similarly the practice of institutions implied by WUA model, such as 
participatory decision-making, election of the governing bodies, etc., is regulated by the rules of the 
kinship institution among others. This confirms the conclusions of Sehring (2009) on institutions in 
water governance referring to the theory of path dependency.  
Case study findings also demonstrate that people in the communities constantly reshape their 
institutions adapting to the changing external influences. In my understanding farmers do not only 
passively change their cropping patterns in response to the restricted water supply but also actively 
adapt mechanisms to improve their access to water. Using a bribe as an incentive to the murab for a 
preferential irrigation of his/her field is not only tolerated in the community but has become informally 
accepted as an institution. This is not only applicable to irrigation but also a wider community life. 
Whereas at the initial stage changes in the institutional arrangements may require a conscious action of 
a bricoleur, repeated practice turns it into a normal legitimate way of acting thus creating the so called 
“logic of practice” (Bourdieu 1990). Justification of the corruption in water distribution by a farmer 
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referring to it as a ‘normal way of getting water urgently’ (HA 2011) confirms that this institution has 
become seen legitimate. So understanding of the process of institutional formation as a combination of 
the existing and new institutions through conscious and unconscious actions of the people aimed at 
adapting to the changes seems to be valid for the selected case.  
The situation in the water sector in Kyrgyzstan prior to launching reforms used to be pictured as a rule 
as one suffering from an institutional gap. Soviet institutions – kolkhoz and sovkhozes - have been 
abolished and no institution is existent that organizes water delivery to farmers’ fields and to takes care 
of the on-farm irrigation infrastructure (Johnson III et al. 2002, ADB 2002). This way of picturing the 
situation as one requiring intervention and introduction of ‘new’ institutions justified launching of the 
extensive water projects financed by the World Bank and ADB. However the case study revealed that 
even in the transition period communities have numerous institutions regulating all aspects of 
community life. Moreover assumption of an ‘institutional gap’ leads to the expectation that the model 
being introduced will produce the intended results described. In my view project or government 
interventions introducing changes in the institutional setup of the communities should be guided by a 
thorough analysis of the actual situation in them.  
Socially embedded or bureaucratic? 
The above views on irrigation institutions can also be attributed to the focus of the government and 
donors on formalized institutions. The progress in implementing IWRM in Kyrgyzstan is estimated to 
achieve good progress on the part of regulatory institutional environment while lagging behind on the 
ecological dimension and sectorial integration. But despite the fact that all enabling legislation is in 
place performance of many WUAs at the local level remain low. This could be explained by the lack of 
social embeddedness of WUA-promoted institutions. Mere formalization of WUAs is not sufficient for 
its success because it relies on active participation of water users in governing it. The reasons why 
institutions of deliberative democracy underlying WUA model are not practiced to their full potential in 
Arka village include: i) top-down manner of WUA establishment, ii) perception of WUA as a 
‘traditional’ management structure, part of the local self-government, iii) contradiction of the notions of 
participation to the more ‘socially embedded’ institutions of kinship, values of respecting the elder, and 
patriarchal beliefs, and iv) generally low awareness of the mechanism and benefits of such 
organization. These factors currently hinder the process of institutionalization of participatory 
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management of WUA in Arka. As discussed earlier changes towards democratic governance will 
initially require conscious actions of water users to be later accepted as a legitimate action reproduced 
unconsciously. Although reportedly awareness raising activities involving the public took place in Arka 
several times, water users still refrain from investing in strengthening this institution. It could also be 
related to the perceived prevalence of kinship rule, which has a long history of effective support. Thus 
the process of social embedding of the new institutions will require time and investment of efforts of 
the water users.  
Importance of social embeddedness of institutions calls practitioners to look beyond formalized 
arrangements. Whereas bureaucratization of an institution can be executed top-down, 
institutionalization and intrusion of institution into community social fabric cannot. As we can see from 
the discussion of the changing status of the court of elders in Arka sadly resulted in the inability of the 
institution to perform its formally assigned tasks. These institutions are constantly changing over time 
and good intentions of reviving ‘traditional’ institutions may even turn harmful like in this case. 
Therefore government and project agents should equally focus on socially embedded institutions as on 
the bureaucratized ones. 
It is necessary to note that the relationship between institutions and people is two-fold. Institutions exist 
through being practiced by people, during which they may be reshaped or adapted to specific situation. 
This happens in social interactions between community members, during which institutions are 
defined, their meaning made. Practice of institutions is informed by the current definition of the 
situation by the person, his/her values, as well as expectations from the interaction. In these 
interactions, where institutions come into play, new knowledge and understanding is created. Therefore 
social interactions represent a forum/venue for institutional changes. Further investigation into how 
communication in social interactions influences institutional setup in irrigation water management 
would be valuable both for scholars and practitioners equally.  
Power and equality 
One of the key principles of IWRM and WUA is equality of access to water resources and equality of 
participation. Post-institutional theory suggests that new institutional arrangements are practiced along 
the existing power structures and may result in reinforcing inequalities. New institutions are adapted 
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and reshaped to fit into the existing institutional setup of the community. Because many institutions in 
the community are universally applied to different spheres of life, the same values and norms influence 
the bricolage process. It is argued that those members of the community in a powerful position can 
influence this process in favour of their interests. As these people usually possess more information and 
enjoy respect and support of the community members they are not willing to promote practice of 
democratic institutions in water resource management. Moreover prevailing culture of respecting the 
people in power means that their authority and decisions are not questioned. The local elite thus has a 
greater power to influence the process of institutional bricolage.  
Given that the existing institutions in Arka do not seem to actively promote equality in distribution of 
water resources, it can be concluded that the new institutions adapted to the local institutional context 
reinforce inequalities. It is visible from the example of preferential allocation of land shares with good 
access to water to those connected to powerful elite, leaving far away plots with poor access to water to 
the less privileged. This practice further exacerbates economic situation of the marginalized group by 
depriving them of agricultural income. Land and water in this situation becomes a symbolic 
representation of belonging to the privileged group in the community.  
Whereas participation of female water users is restricted by the norms of a patriarchal society, the 
marginalized members of the community usually do not have information and time to fully participate 
in governing WUA and decision-making. This confirms that democratic principles of WUA operation 
currently are not able to address social exclusion patterns existing in the community. Additionally, 
government and donor agents as a rule choose representatives of the local elite as their focal point for 
carrying out reforms and projects empowering them further to influence institutional arrangement of 
resource distribution in the community. Recognition of power relations is therefore key in order to 
avoid such practice. Also a longer-term research on the implications of institutional reforms in 
irrigation on the marginalized population, including women, may provide further insights into 
challenges for their participation in governing the resources.  
Findings of the case study as well as widespread difficulties faced by the WUAs across the country 
raise a question whether this model can be universally applied. Although intended benefits of this 
organization on many dimensions of community life are acknowledged, specific cultural, historical and 
institutional contexts of communities are not considered. Introduction of WUAs substantially 
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intervenes in the institutional setup of the communities. However as post-institutional theory suggests it 
cannot become operational unless rooted in the existing institutions. Some progress has been achieved 
in the development of WUAs in Arka, nevertheless its key principle, which is equality, cannot be 
ensured unless democratic values are accepted by the entire community. The process of 
institutionalization is very hard to achieve from top down. It requires a long time and investment of a 
lot of resources. Therefore in my opinion it is ‘easier’ and more sustainable to turn this process around. 
Building on the existing successful experiences of collective action in the community will lift the 
necessity to institutionalize the externally imposed models. These experiences are rooted in the 
community institutions, value system, norms, beliefs, and worldview, which is difficult to achieve in 
the institutions brought in from outside of the community.  
It can be concluded that post-institutional theory proved useful in analyzing the challenges of 
introducing IWRM principles in water resource management in Arka village of Kyrgyzstan. It allowed 
to bring historical and local cultural contexts into the discussion of water reform efforts. Thus 
conceptualization of institutional interventions at the grass roots level as planting ‘ideal’ models of 
collective action with incentives and sanctions incorporated in institutions did not produce the expected 
outcome. Instead this case study helped to discover a complex web of institutions developed through a 
long history of changing regimes that inform people’s actions in various aspects of community life. The 
new institutions of water governance introduced in Arka during the reforms, such as WUA, ISF, 
participatory governance, are going through the process of institutionalization. In this process 
community members are partly consciously and partly unconsciously developing their own local 
‘hybrid’ institutions, which contain elements of old and new institutions. Therefore institutions 
introduced through reforms are never completely new, but adapted and changed to fit the local 
ideology, culture and changing needs. Thus interventions without recognition of the local institutional 
context and power relations risk failure in achieving the intended results and in the worst case 
undermining local power balance or reinforcing the inequities. The question then remains can 
institutional reforms in NRM implemented in a top-down manner be successful.    
  
48 
 
8 Conclusion 
With this study I set out to analyze the challenges faced in the process of introducing IWRM principles 
in the water resources governance in the communities of Kyrgyzstan. To accomplish this goal I chose 
to employ the concepts of post-institutional theory. In contrast to the mainstream theories informing 
IWRM framework post-institutional theory pays attention to the local historical, cultural and social 
contexts. The case study demonstrates that these factors play a key role in the process of 
institutionalization of new concepts introduced during the reform. Illustrations are the Water Users 
Association. It is intended to be managed by the users in a participatory, transparent manner, cover its 
costs through water fees and ensure equal distribution of resources to all users. Unsatisfactory progress 
of WUA principles of participatory management in Arka village is attributed to their contradiction with 
historically maintained institutions of kinship, respect to the elders, to local elite and perception of 
WUA as a governmental organization. Institutions are constantly shaped and readapted to the new 
circumstances in the community life. In the process of bricolage people select and combine elements of 
the previous and new institutions available at hand through conscious actions and unconscious practice 
of familiar institutions. Hence institutional reforms fail to deliver the expected results. Consequently it 
is crucial to get an understanding of the existing institutional setup in the water resource management 
before introducing new ones. 
The case study analysis also confirmed an assumption of the post-institutional theory that newly 
introduced institutions might end up favouring the interests of the local elite and reinforcing inequality 
in the community. Election of the members of WUA’s executive body mainly on the basis of belonging 
to a kinship network or the privileged group leads to further preferential treatment of members of this 
group and marginalization of others. Moreover, extremely low participation of women in water 
resource management due to patriarchal values results in underrepresentation of their interests. 
Therefore recognition of power relations in the community during interventions is important to avoid 
reinforcement of misbalances. Further research on implications of institutional reforms in irrigation on 
the marginalized population, including women, may provide further insights into challenges for their 
participation in governing the resources. 
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As social interactions play a central role in practicing institutions and serve as a venue for any 
institutional changes taking place in the community, it is important to investigate how communication 
in social interactions influences institutional setup in irrigation water management. Institutions exist 
through their practice by the community members in their interactions, and can be changed and adapted 
during the practice. Understanding of the role of communication in enforcing institutional changes 
would be valuable both for scholars and practitioners equally. 
Lastly, given such importance of the local context in institutional reforms and uniqueness of 
institutional setup in NRM in different communities it is concluded that building on the existing 
successful experiences of collective action in the community could be a more effective way for 
improving NRM practices. This would lift the necessity to institutionalize the externally imposed 
models.  
  
50 
 
References   
1. Abdullaev, I., Kazbekov, J., Manthritilake, H., Jumaboev, K., 2009. Water User Groups in Central 
Asia: Emerging Form of Collective Action in Irrigation Water Management. Springer Science. 
Available online: www.springerlink.com/index/0334045835g28005.pdf. 
 
2. Allouche, J., 2007. The Governance of Central Asian waters: National Interests versus Regional 
Cooperation. Disarmament Forum, No. 4 (2007) 45-55 
 
3. Asian Development Bank (ADB), 2002. Program Performance Audit Report on the Agriculture 
Sector Program in the Kyrgyz Republic. 
 
4. BBC News Home Page, 2011. Kyrgyzstan Country Profile.  http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-
pacific/country_profiles/1296485.stm (accessed Month Year) 
5. Bichsel, C., 2008. Conflict Transformation in Central Asia. Irrigation Disputes in the Ferghana 
Valley. London, UK: Routledge 
6. Bourdieu, P., 1990. The Scholastic Point of View. Cultural Anthropology, 5: 380–391. 
7. CAIConsulting, 2010. Otchet po provedeniyu otsenki deyatelnosti Assotsiatsiy vodopol’zovatelei 
yujnyh oblastei Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki (Report on Assessment of the Water Users Associations in 
the Southern Oblasts of Kyrgyzstan). Prepared for OSCE. Available at: 
http://www.osce.org/bishkek/76142. Accessed on May 13, 2011. 
8. Chemonics 2008. Land Market Development Report: Analysis and Recommendations. Prepared for 
USAID Land Reform and Market Development Project, Bishkek. Unpublished. 
 
9. Chikozho, C., 2008. Globalizing Integrated Water Resources Management: A Complicated Option 
in Southern Africa. Water Resources Management, 22, 1241-1257. 
10. Cleaver, F., 2002. Reinventing Institutions: Bricolage and the Social Embeddedness of Natural 
Resource Management. The European Journal of Development Research, Volume 14, Number 2, 
December 2002 , pp. 11-30(20)  
11. Cleaver, F., and Franks, T., 2005. How Institutions Elude Design: River Basin Management and 
Sustainable Livelihoods. BCID Research Paper Nº 12.University of Bradford, Bradford, UK. 
 
12. Del Callejo, I., and Cossío, V., 2009. Institutional Aspects of Sustainability for Irrigated 
Agriculture in Arid and Semi-Arid Regions.Chilean Journal of Agricultural Research 69 (Suppl. 
1):41-53 (December 2009) 
 
13. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations. AQUASTAT FAO’s Information 
System on Water and Agriculture. Available online: 
http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/main/index.stm 
 
51 
 
14. Foundation for Tolerance International (FTI), 2003. Conflict-analiz po adresnoi zone proecta 
“Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan” – Arka-Kostakoz. Otchet po monitoringu.  Unpublished monitoring report. 
15. Gleason, G.W., & Buck, S.J., 1993. Decolonization in the Former Soviet Borderlands: Politics in 
Search of Principles. Political Science & Politics, September 1993 v26 n3 p522(4).  
16. Herrfahrdt , E., Kipping, M., Pickardt, T., Polak, M., Rohrer, C., Wolff, C., F., 2005. Local Water 
Management in the Kyrgyz Agricultural Sector: On its way to IWRM? Preliminary report of the 
country working group Kyrgyzstan. German Development Institute 
17. Herrfahrdt, E., 2006. Water Governance Reforms in the Kyrgyz Republic. Paper presented at the 
Conference on “Prosperity and Poverty in a Globalized World – Challenges for Agricultural 
Research”. Bonn, October 11-13, 2006. 
 
18. International Crisis Group (ICG), 2002. Central Asia: Water and Conflict. ICG Asia Report N34. 
Osh/Brussels. Available online: 
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/7BB5CB3539D928DA85256BC9006F79A1-
icg-uzb-30may.pdf 
19. Johnson III, S.H., Stoutjesdijk, J. and Djailobayev N., 2002. Irrigation Reform in the Kyrgyz 
Republic. Sixth International Seminar on Participatory Irrigation Management: Institutional Options 
for User Participation Beijing, China March 2002 
20. Lerman, Z., and Sedik, D., 2009. Agrarian Reform in Kyrgyzstan: Achievements and Unfinished 
Agenda. FAO Regional Office for Europe and Central Asia. Policy Studies on Rural Transition No. 
2009-1 
21. O’Hara, S.L., 2000. Lessons from the Past: Water Management in Central Asia. Water Policy 2 
(2000), pp. 365-384  
22. Ostrom, E., 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action 
(Cambridge Univ. Press, New York, 1990).  
 
23. Saravanan, V., S., McDonald, G.,T., Mollinga, P.,P., 2009. Critical Review of Integrated Water 
Resources Management: Moving Beyond Polarised Discourse. Natural Resources Forum 33 
(2009), pp. 76–86 
 
24. Sehring, J., 2005. Water Users Associations (WUAs) in Kyrgyzstan. A Case Study on Institutional 
Reform in Local Irrigation Management. Discussion Paper No 24, Giessen. Zentrum für 
internationale Entwicklungs- und Umweltforschungder Justus-Liebig-Universität Gießen 
 
25. Sehring, J., 2006. The politics of water institutional reform: A comparative analysis of Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan. Paper presented at the 2006 Berlin Conference on Human Dimensions of Global 
Environmental Change “Resource Policies: Effectiveness, Efficiency and Equity”. Berlin, 17-18 
November 2006 
26. Sehring, J., 2009.  Path Dependencies and Institutional Bricolage in Post-Soviet Water Governance. 
Water Alternatives 2 (1), pp. 61-81. www.water-alternatives.org 
27. Shah, T., B. van Koppen, D. Merrey, M. de Lange, and M. Samad. 2002. Institutional alternatives 
in African smallholder irrigation: Lessons from international experience with irrigation 
52 
 
management transfer. Research Report 60. 33 p. International Water Management Institute 
(IWMI), Colombo, Sri Lanka. 
 
28. State Committee of Water Resources and Melioration of Kyrgyz Republic Home Page, 2011. 
Structure of the State Committee of Water Resources and Melioration of Kyrgyz Republic. 
www.water.kg /dvch_home.htm 
29. Ul Hassan, M., Starkloff, R., Nizamedinkhodjaeva, N., 2004. Inadequacies in the Water Reforms in 
the Kyrgyz Republic. An Institutional Analysis. International Water Management Institute, 
Colombo. 
30. Van der Zaag, P., 2005. Integrated Water Resources Management: Relevant concept or irrelevant 
buzzword? A capacity building and research agenda for Southern Africa. Physics and Chemistry of 
the Earth, Volume 30, Issue 11-16, p. 867-871. 
 
31. Wegerich, K., 2000. Water Users Associations in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan: Study on conditions 
for sustainable development. Occasional Paper No 32. Water Issues Study Group School of 
Oriental and African Studies (SOAS). University of London, UK. 
32. World Bank Home Page, 2011. Kyrgyz Republic at a Glance. 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/ECAEXT/KYRGYZEXTN/0,,cont
entMDK:20536732~menuPK:1267623~pagePK:1497618~piPK:217854~theSitePK:305761,00.htm
l (accessed Month, Year) 
33. World Bank, 2008. Implementation Completion and Results Report on On-Farm Irrigation Project. 
Report No: ICR0000866 
  
 
 
List of the Legislative Documents 
LD 1. The Decree of the President of the Kyrgyz Republic “On measures to enhance the land and 
agrarian reform in the Kyrgyz Republic” dated 22 February 1994, N VII-23 
LD 2. The Law of the Kyrgyz Republic “On Water” dated 14 January 1994, N 1422-XII 
LD 3. The Resolution of the Government of Kyrgyz Republic “On Associations of Water Users in the 
rural areas” dated 13 August 1997, N 473 
LD 4. The Law of the Kyrgyz Republic ”On Water Users Associations” dated 15 March 2002, N 38 
  
53 
 
Interviewees List 
# Initials Sex Role 
1 BM male representative of donor organization 
2 ST male representative of donor organization 
3 NS male representative of agricultural extension service 
4 BK male representative of the State Committee on Water 
Resources and Melioration 
5 SM male representative of Leilek District WUA Support Unit 
6 SA male representative of Leilek District WUA Support Unit 
7 AN male representative of Leilek District Water Management 
Department 
8 IA male head of Arka village 
9 UA female local teacher 
10 AG male head of WUA “Aikol” in Arka village 
11 HA male local successful farmer 
12 OG male accountant of WUA “Aikol” in Arka village 
13 SE male  local resident, who does not cultivate his land share, 
owns small business 
14 AB male aksakal, respected person in the village, former sovkhoz 
worker 
15 AH male young farmer, returning migrant 
16 ES female local farmer, cultivates land on lease with the family 
17 IA male former murab of Arka 
18 JB female former hydro-engineer of sovkhoz, retires, leases out her 
land 
19 TJ male head of drinking water users association, member of the 
local council 
20 AS male former sovkhoz agronomist, retired 
21 IH female former head of the women’s brigade of sovkhoz, does 
not cultivate land due to long distance and no water 
22 JI female local resident, leases out her land share avoiding risk of 
crop failure 
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Annexes 
 
Annex 1. Distribution of water resources in Central Asia 
 
 Uzbekistan Turkmenistan Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan 
Amu Darya 48.2% 35.8% - 0.6% 15.6% 
Syrdarya 50.5% - 42.0% 0.5% 7.0% 
Source: Sehring 2006 
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Annex 2. List of major projects active in water reform in Kyrgyzstan 
Project name Financed by Dates Interventions 
Rehabilitation of irrigation 
systems 
World Bank 1998-2006 Institutional development, 
capacity building, infrastructure 
rehabilitation 
On-Farm irrigation project World Bank ongoing Establishment of WUAs, capacity 
building, infrastructure 
rehabilitation 
Improving water resource 
management 
Government of 
Japan 
2006-2011 Capacity building 
Agriculture development 
project in Chuy Oblast 
Asian 
Development Bank 
1999-2005 Rehabilitation of irrigation and 
drainage infrastructure 
Water Users Associations 
Support Programme 
USAID 2004-2011 Capacity building, small grants 
Integrated Water Resources 
Management in Ferghana 
Valley 
SDC ongoing Capacity building, small grants 
Southern agricultural 
development project 
Asian 
Development Bank 
ongoing Rehabilitation of irrigation and 
drainage infrastructure 
Improving water resource 
management 
World Bank ongoing Rehabilitation of irrigation 
infrastructure, capacity building 
activities 
Efficient use of water SDC ongoing Developing local innovations in 
water saving technologies 
Source: Own compilation according to CAIConsulting 2010, various websites  
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Annex 3. Institutional arrangement of water sector in Kyrgyzstan 
 
 
 
Government of 
Kyrgyzstan 
State Committee on 
Water Resources and 
Melioration 
Ministry of Agriculture 
Ministry of Natural 
Resources 
Ministry of Environment 
other 
National Water 
Council 
 Provincial Basin 
Water Management 
Departments 
 District Basin Water 
Management 
Departments 
Water Users 
Associations 
Farmers/Water users 
7 provincial 
administrations 
(Oblast) 
40 district 
administrations 
(Rayon) 
Local self-
government 
bodies (Ayil 
okrug) 
WUA Support 
Unit 
WUA Support 
Unit 
WUA Support 
Unit 
Donors 
Scientific 
institutions 
Universities 
Source: Own compilation according to Herrfahrdt et al. 2005 and official website of the State Committee on Water 
Resources and Melioration of the Kyrgyz Republic www.water.kg 
